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Solving large-scale linear systems of equations (LSEs) is one of the most common and
fundamental problems in big data. But such problems are often too expensive to solve
for resource-limited users. Cloud computing has been proposed as an efficient and cost-
effective way of solving such tasks. Nevertheless, one critical concern in cloud computing
is data privacy. Many previous works on secure outsourcing of LSEs have high compu-
tational complexity and share a common serious problem, i.e., a huge number of external
memory I/O operations, which may render those outsourcing schemes impractical. We de-
velop a practical secure outsourcing algorithm for solving large-scale LSEs, which has both
low computational complexity and low memory I/O complexity and can protect clients pri-
vacy well. We implement our algorithm on a real-world cloud server and a laptop. We find
that the proposed algorithm offers significant time savings for the client (up to 65%) com-
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In recent years, many large-scale systems and applications have emerged which deal
with huge volumes of data. For example, social networks need to monitor and record inter-
actions among millions or billions of users [3] [8]; scientists need to sequence the genome
of complex organisms [10]; and power system operators collect enormous amounts of data
from the electric grid for real-time monitoring and offline analysis [7]. Due to advances in
computer memory, large-scale data sets can be stored in a cost-effective manner. However,
analyzing them requires extensive computing resources which are usually very expensive
capital investments. Therefore, both individuals and organizations face a formidable chal-
lenge in trying to analyze large-scale data sets in a timely and cost-effective way. This
challenge has attracted significant attention from industry, academia and governments, who
have identified it as a new technology field, called Big Data [13, 18].
Solving large-scale linear systems of equations (LSEs) of the form Ax = b is one of
the most common and fundamental problems in big data. But such problems are often too
expensive to solve for resource-limited users. Some researchers and commercial entities
suggest cloud computing as a timely, efficient, and cost-effective way of solving such com-
puting tasks [4, 9, 12, 21, 22]. In cloud computing, clients outsource their computing tasks
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to the cloud, which contains a large amount of computing resources and offers them on a
pay per-use basis [20]. In this computing paradigm, clients share the cloud resources with
each other, and avoid purchasing, installing, and maintaining sophisticated and expensive
computing hardware and software.
Nevertheless, one critical concern in cloud computing is data privacy. To be more
prominent, in many cases, clients’s LSEs contain private data that should remain hidden
from the cloud for ethical, legal, or security reasons. For example, a person’s genome could
be disclosed by a computing task from a health-care provider [18]; a company’s data set
may reveal proprietary processes, which are an attractive target for corporate espionage; or
data from power system operators contain information that can be exploited to attack the
electric grid [16]. Thus, in order for people to really adopt cloud computing, we have to
design tools and technologies that allow clients to outsource the computing of their LSEs
to the cloud while preserving the privacy of their data. The fact that clients lack computing
and storage resources also limits the complexity of operations that they can perform to
hide their data from the cloud, which makes secure outsourcing an even more challenging
problem.
1.2 Related Works
Some previous works on securely outsourcing computing tasks to the cloud could be
used to solve LSEs. However, they suffer from high computing requirements. In [5], Gen-
naro et al. utilize fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to securely outsource computations
to the cloud. Although the scheme is very attractive and offers theoretical privacy guar-
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antees, FHE itself is a computationally intensive operation, and large-scale computations
based on FHE ciphertexts are very expensive, even for the cloud. Wang et al. [23] [25]
propose methods to privately outsource a linear programming problem. A client may em-
ploy these methods to find the solution to an LSE by requesting the cloud to solve a spe-
cial linear program. Unfortunately, to protect data privacy, the client needs to perform a
matrix-matrix multiplication that is prohibitively expensive because this operation has a
computational complexity of O(nρ) for 2 < ρ ≤ 3 (for n× n matrices).
Recently a few secure outsourcing algorithms have been developed specifically for
solving LSEs. Lei et al. [14] and Atallah et al. [1] design secure matrix inversion algo-
rithms that use matrix permutations to preserve data privacy. To find the solution to an
LSE, a client performs operations with O(n2) complexity. Wang et al. [24] develop an
iterative algorithm specifically to solve LSEs, where a client transforms and encrypts the
coefficient matrix using homomorphic encryption, and the cloud carries out computations
on ciphertexts. Specifically, the client needs to perform two matrix-vector multiplications,
which require O(n2) floating-point (flops) operations, and O(n2) homomorphic encryp-
tions. Note that performing homomorphic encryptions has high computational complexity
(O(log2 e) flops per encrypted value, were e is the key size). Although it is proposed that
the client could outsource this computation to a trusted third-party, it may not always exist.
The use of homomorphic encryption also forces the cloud to operate on ciphertexts, which
then has to use specialized linear algebra software and performs operations with higher
computational complexity. Besides, the proposed algorithm only works for LSEs whose
coefficient matrices are diagonally dominant, and the privacy will be compromised if the
3
number of iterations approaches or exceeds n. Later on, Chen et al. [2] also propose simi-
lar solutions to outsourcing linear programs and LSEs while preserving users’ privacy. We
notice that most such works’ computational complexities are still high.
More importantly, previous works [1, 2, 14, 24] share a common serious problem, i.e.,
a huge number of memory I/O operations. This problem has been largely neglected in the
previous secure outsourcing algorithm design. But we stress that the number of times an
algorithm accesses a matrix is of particular importance for outsourcing a large-scale LSE
and can eventually render the algorithm impractical. The reason is as follows. Most often a
client lacks enough RAM memory to store a large-scale matrix completely at once. So, in-
stead of working on RAM memory directly, as is the case with smaller matrices, the client
can only load a small section of the large-scale matrix at a time and write the results to
external memory when it is done. However, reading and writing operations from and into
external memory have a very high latency compared to the same operations in RAM. For
example, our experiments show that reading a matrix once with dimension 30, 000×30, 000
and size 10GB on a laptop that has 4GB RAM and a hard disk at 5400RPM would take
about 15 minutes. Therefore, any practical algorithm for large-scale LSEs should only
incur as small the number of memory I/O operations for the client as possible. To bet-
ter capture the special memory I/O requirement of large-scale LSEs, we propose a new
definition of memory I/O complexity, which is the number of values that are read/written
from/into external memory. Previous works have very high storage complexity. For exam-
ple, a client needs to access the elements of a matrix at least four times in [1, 14], and five
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times in [24], respectively, which may take an unacceptably long time due to the latency
of the huge number of I/O operations in practice.
Aiming to reduce both computational and memory I/O complexities, in this paper,
we develop an efficient and practical secure outsourcing algorithm for solving large-scale
LSEs. Specifically, to protect its data privacy, a client generates a random matrix to trans-
form the original coefficient matrix A into matrix Â via a matrix addition. We prove that
matrix Â is computationally indistinguishable from a random matrix. Then, based on the
conjugate gradient method, the client finds the solution vector x iteratively with the help
of the cloud. Since the client delegates expensive matrix-vector operations to the cloud, it
has computational complexity of O(n2). Besides, it has very low memory I/O complexity
of 4n2 + 2n. The algorithm preserves the privacy of the client, i.e, hides A, x, and b, by
letting the cloud operate on the transformed matrix Â and some intermediate values, rather
than on A, x, or b. Moreover, since matrix Â is the result of a linear algebra operation,
the cloud can use traditional linear algebra software, and avoid the costly exponentiations
required for ciphertext-based operations as in [24].
We summarize our main contributions as follows.
• We develop an efficient and practical algorithm to securely outsource the computa-
tion of large-scale LSEs
• The proposed algorithm requires operations with low computational and storage
complexities from the client. In particular, the computational complexity is O(n2)
and the memory I/O complexity is 4n2+2n read/write operations. We compare both
complexities of our algorithm with those of previous algorithms and find that our
algorithm is much more efficient.
• We show that the cloud is unable to obtain any information about the client’s LSE.
Different from [24] where privacy can only be protected if the algorithm converges
in fewer than n iterations, the privacy in our algorithm can be protected no matter
how many iterations are needed.
5
• We implement our algorithm on a real-world cloud server and a laptop. We find
that the proposed algorithm offers significant time savings for the client (up to 65%)
compared to previous algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the considered
system architecture and threat model. Section 3 describes the proposed privacy-preserving
matrix transformation. Section 4 presents in detail the proposed algorithm for secure out-
sourcing of LSEs, while Section 5 analyzes the computational complexity, storage com-
plexity, and privacy of the proposed algorithm. We present our experimental results in




In this section, we present the system architecture considered in this paper, and intro-
duce the threat model.
2.1 System Architecture
We consider an asymmetric two-party computing architecture as shown in Fig. 2.1,
where a cloud client (CC) is resource-limited while a remote cloud server (CS) has abun-
dant computing resources. The CC intends to solve a large-scale computing task, but
cannot complete it on its own. So the CC offloads the most expensive computations to the
CS and collaborates with it to find the solution to the large-scale LSE. In this work, we
concentrate on the computing task of finding the solution to a large-scale LSE:
Ax = b (2.1)
where A ∈ Rm×n (m ≥ n) is the coefficient matrix, x ∈ Rn×1 is the solution vector, and
b ∈ Rm×1 is the constant vector. We assume that A, x, and b contain, or could reveal
private information of the CC.
7
Figure 2.1
A Secure Architecture for Outsourcing LSEs
2.2 Threat Model
We assume a malicious threat model for the CS. That is, the CS tries to extract infor-
mation from the CC’s data and from the results of its own computations, and may attempt
to deviate from the proposed protocols and return erroneous results.
To enable the CC to securely delegate computing tasks to the CS, the data that the CC
shares with the CS should appear random. This notion of privacy is known as computa-
tional indistinguishability [11], and is defined as follows.
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2.2.1 Definition 1 Computational Indistinguishability
Two probability ensembles X = {Xs}n∈N and Y = {Ys}n∈N, are computationally
indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D there exists a
negligible function µ(n) such that
∣∣Pr[D(Xs) = 1]− Pr[D(Ys) = 1]∣∣ < µ(s) (2.2)
where the notation D(Xs) means that x is chosen according to distribution Xs and then
D(x) is run. Distinguisher D(x) returns 1 if it determines that x is chosen according to
distribution Xs.
Moreover, this definition can be extended to the case where a distinguisher D has access
to multiple samples of the vectors X and Y , i.e., when comparing two matrices.
2.2.2 Definition 2
Let R ∈ Rm×n be a random matrix with entries in its jth column sampled from a
uniform distribution with interval [−Lj, Lj] ∀j ∈ [1, n]. Matrices R and Â ∈ Rm×n are
computationally indistinguishable if for any probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher
D(·) there exists a negligible function µ(·) such that
|P [D(ri,j) = 1]− Pr[D(âi,j) = 1]| ≤ µ(n) (2.3)
where i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n], ri,j is the element in the ith row and jth column of R, and âi,j
is the element in the ith row and jth column of Â. Distinguisher D(ri,j) outputs 1 when it
identifies the input as a uniform distribution in the range [−Lj, Lj], and zero otherwise.
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CHAPTER 3
A PRIVACY-PRESERVING MATRIX TRANSFORMATION
Before delving into details about our proposed algorithm for outsourcing large-scale
LSEs, we first present a privacy-preserving matrix transformation scheme.
3.1 Conceal Information
To delegate a computing task to the CS, the CC first needs to perform some compu-
tations on its data. These computations should hide the data from the CS, require light
computational effort from the CC, and at the same time allow the CS to return a mean-
ingful result. To this end, we design a light-weight privacy-preserving matrix transfor-
mation based on matrix addition that offers computational indistinguishability, that is, a
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm is unable to differentiate between the transformed
matrix and a random matrix with non-negligible probability.
In particular, the CC hides its private information in the coefficient matrix A by apply-
ing a matrix addition as follows:
Â = A+ Z (3.1)
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where Z ∈ Rm×n is a random matrix, and âi,j = ai,j + zi,j ∀ i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n] where
ai,j is the element in the ith row and jth column of A. We assume that the values of matrix
A are within the range [−K,K], where K = 2l (l > 0) is a positive constant.
To reduce the CC’s computational complexity, the random matrix Z is formed by a
vector outer-product, i.e.,
Z = uv⊤ (3.2)
where u ∈ Rm×1 is a vector of uniformly distributed random variables with probability





−c < ui < c
0 otherwise
, (3.3)
where c = 2p (p > 0) is a positive constant, and i ∈ [1,m]. Vector v ∈ Rn×1 is a vector of
arbitrary positive constants ranging from 2l and 2l+q (q > 0). Note that element zi,j = uivj
(∀i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n]) of matrix Z is the product of a random variable and a positive






−Lj < gi,j < Lj
0 otherwise
(3.4)
where Lj = cvj (∀j ∈ [1, n]) and hence is between 2p+l and 2p+l+q. We can now arrive
at a theorem about the computational indistinsguishability between Â and a matrix with
columns filled with values taken from uniform distributions.
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3.2 A Theorem
Let R be a random matrix with entries in its jth column sampled from a uniform
distribution with interval [−Lj, Lj] (∀j ∈ [1, n]). Matrices R and Â are computationally
indistinguishable.
3.2.1 Proof
According to Definition 2.2.2, we need to show that ri,j and âi,j (∀i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n])
are computationally indistinguishable for matrices R and Â to be computationally indis-
tinguishable. In particular, we show that any probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher D
cannot distinguish âi,j from ri,j for any ∀i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n] except with non-negligible
success probability.
Recall that values from R and A are in the intervals [−Lj, Lj] and [−K,K], respec-
tively. Thus, we have âi,j ∈ [−K − Lj, K + Lj], and hence ri,j, âi,j ∈ [−2κ, 2κ] where
κ = p + l + q + 1. The best strategy for distinguisher D when presented with a sam-
ple x = âi,j is to return b ← {0, 1} with equal probability if −Lj ≤ x ≤ Lj , and 1 if
x < −Lj or x > Lj . Therefore, when x = âi,j , we have that the success probability of the





Pr[−Lj ≤ âi,j ≤ Lj]




(1− Pr[âi,j < −Lj]− Pr[âi,j > Lj])
+Pr[âi,j < −Lj] + Pr[âi,j > Lj] (3.5)
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where
Pr[âi,j > Lj] = Pr[ai,j + zi,j > Lj]
= Pr[zi,j > Lj − ai,j]





Similarly, we find that Pr[â < −Lj] ≤ K2Lj . Consequently, we have that the probability of
success for distinguisher D, when x = âi,j , is bounded as follows:







On the other hand, if x = ri,j , we can obtain that Pr[D(ri,j) = 1] = 12 . According to
equation (2.3), for any ∀i ∈ [1,m], j ∈ [1, n] we get that


















which is a negligible function. This concludes the proof.
13
CHAPTER 4
SECURE OUTSOURCING OF LARGE-SCALE LSES
In this section, we develop a practical and light-weight algorithm to securely outsource
a large-scale LSE to the CS based on the conjugate gradient method (CGM).
4.1 The Conjugate Gradient Method






where A′ is symmetric and positive definite [19]. Therefore, we use the CGM algorithm
that solves the above optimization problem to solve (2.1).
Specifically, as any gradient directions (GD) method, the CGM employs a set of vec-
tors P = {p0,p1, . . .pn} that are conjugate with respect to A′, that is, at iteration k the
following condition is met:
p⊤k A
′pi = 0 for i = 0, . . . , k − 1. (4.2)
Using the conjugacy property of vectors in P , we can find the solution in at most n steps
by computing a sequence of solution approximations as follows:
xk+1 = xk + αkpk (4.3)
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where αk is the one-dimensional minimizer of (4.1) along xk + αkpk. The minimizer αk
can be found by setting (4.1) to zero and taking its gradient when x = xk+1
∇f(xk+1) = A′xk+1 − b′ = 0. (4.4)






where rk = A′xk − b′ is called the residual.
Moreover, we can find the residual iteratively based on (4.3) as follows:
rk+1 = A
′xk+1 − b′
= A′(xk + αkpk)− b′ = rk + αkA′pk. (4.6)
Efficiently finding the set of conjugate vectors P is a major challenge in GD methods.
The CGM algorithm offers an efficient way of finding P that has low storage and compu-
tational complexity. In particular, the CGM finds a new conjugate vector pk+1 at iteration
k by a linear combination of the negative residual, i.e., the steepest descent direction of
f(x), and the current conjugate vector pk, that is,
pk+1 = −rk+1 + βk+1pk (4.7)
where βk+1 is chosen in such a way that p⊤k+1 and pk meet condition (4.2). By multiplying
p⊤k A
′ from the left in (4.7), we get
p⊤k A









Since as mentioned above p⊤k and p
⊤
k+1 are conjugate with respect to A
′, we have p⊤k A
′pk+1 =
0. Note that p⊤k A







Moreover, since xk minimizes f(x) along pk, it can be shown that r⊤k pi = 0 for
i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 [19]. Using this fact and equation (4.7), a more efficient computation
for (4.5) can be found, namely,
αk =








Similarly, using (4.6), we can find a more efficient formulation for βk+1. First, we replace
A′pk with 1α(rk+1 − rk) in (4.10) to get
βk+1 =
r⊤k+1(rk+1 − rk)
p⊤k (rk+1 − rk)
(4.12)
Then, using the fact that p⊤k rk+1 = 0 and r
⊤











To summarize the above, the CGM algorithm is as follows. At iteration k = 0, we have
r0 = A
′x0 − b′ (4.15)
p0 = −r0 (4.16)
k = 0 (4.17)






rk+1 = rk + αkA
′pk (4.19)





pk+1 = −rk+1 + βk+1pk (4.22)
Compared to other methods, e.g., Gaussian eliminations, QR decomposition, CGM offers
a feasible algorithm for extremely large-scale systems.
4.2 The Privacy-preserving CGM Algorithm
In what follows, we describe our proposed privacy-preserving CGM algorithm (PPCG-
M) that exploits the structure of the CGM method to securely shift the relatively more
expensive operations, i.e., matrix-vector multiplications, in each iteration to the CS.
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4.2.1 LSE Transformation
As shown in Section 6.2, the CGM algorithm only works with symmetric and positive
definite matrices. Therefore, the CC can transform the original LSE (2.1) to the following
equivalent LSE:
A′x = b′ (4.23)
where A′ = A⊤A is symmetric and positive definite, and b′ = A⊤b.
Since computing A′ requires a matrix-matrix multiplication, which has complexity of
O(nρ), the CC can outsource the computation to the CS. To be more prominent, the CC
generates a random matrix Z0 = u0v⊤0 as described in Section 3 and then sends a masked
matrix Â0 to the CS:
Â0 = A+ Z0. (4.24)
As proved before, Â0 is computationally indistinguishable from a random matrix and
hence does not reveal any information about A. The CS carries out the following secure
computation:
G = Â⊤0 Â0
= A⊤A+M (4.25)
where M = Z⊤0 A + A
⊤Z0 + Z
⊤
0 Z0. Thus, upon receiving G, the CC can obtain the
symmetric positive definite matrix A′ by
A′ = G−M. (4.26)
18














We summarize this LSE transformation scheme in Algorithm 4.1. Next, the CC and
the CS collaboratively carry out the CGM algorithm to solve A′x = b′. Note that A′ can
be calculated just once for many LSEs that share the same A′ but have different b′’s. For
example, power system operators solve many state estimation problems for system mon-
itoring and control. These problems have different measurements, i.e., b′’s, but the same
A′ which depends on network topology and does not change frequently. Thus, finding A′
once is enough to solve a large number of LSEs.
Table 4.1
Algorithm 1 LSE Transformation
REQUIRE CC ←A,b
1. Generate matrix Z0
2. Construct Â0 using (4.24) and send it to CS
3. Receive G
4. Calculate A′ using (4.26)
5. Calculate b′ = A⊤b using
ENSURE A′,b′
4.2.2 Initialization
In the initialization step, the CC sets the initial solution vector x0 to a random vector
of Rn×1, and tries to compute r0 and p0 according to equations (4.15) and (4.16). Since
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computing A′x0 requires a matrix-vector multiplication, the CC can outsource this com-
putation to the CS.
Particularly, the CC generates a masked coefficient matrix Â′ = A′ + Z, where Z =
uv⊤ as described in Section 3, and sends it together with x0 to the CS. The CS helps the




Upon receiving h0, the CC computes the residual vector as follows
r0 = A
′x0 − b′
= h0 − u(v⊤x0)− b′. (4.29)
By computing v⊤x0 first in equation (4.29), the CC computes vector-vector compu-
tations only, which have linear complexity. This is possible due to the fact that Z is a
rank-one matrix and can be decomposed into an outer-vector product. If we had formed Z
arbitrarily, the client would not experience any computational or storage complexity gains.
At the end of the initialization step, the client sets the conjugate vector p0 = −r0, and
transmits it along with r0 to the CS.
4.2.3 Main Iteration
Exploring the CGM iteration, i.e., equations (4.18)-(4.22), we notice that equations
(4.18) and (4.19) need matrix-vector multiplications involving the coefficient matrix A′,
while the rest of the equations only require vector-vector multiplications. We exploit these
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equations to design an efficient collaborative computation between the CC and the CS,
where the CS helps compute (4.18) and (4.19), and the CC carries out the rest of the
equations by itself. To protect the CC’s privacy, the CS carries out computations with the
transformed matrix Â′, instead of A′. In what follows, we describe a set of operations that
allow the CC to efficiently find xn, while protecting its data privacy.
To compute αk, the CC and the CS carry out equation (4.18) in two steps. First, the CS





Second, the CC finds αk using tk as follows
αk =
r⊤k rk
tk − (p⊤k u)(v⊤pk)
. (4.31)




which allows the CC to compute rk+1 as follows
rk+1 = rk + αk(fk − uv⊤pk). (4.33)
Note that when calculating αk and rk+1 we have also used the fact that Z is rank-one
to provide computational gains to the CC. That is, the CC carries out the computations of
αk and rk+1 in linear time via vector-vector multiplications.
Equations (4.20)-(4.22) only require vector-vector operations, hence they all can be
computed entirely by the CC itself. At the end of the kth iteration, the CC transmits pk+1
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to the CS for the next iteration k+1. Iterations terminate according to the stopping criteria
suggested by Golub and Van Loan [6], i.e.,
√
r⊤k rk ≤ ν||b||2, where ν is a tolerance value.
We summarize the PPCGM algorithm for the CC in Algorithm 4.2. Moreover, we note
that since the CS has an economic incentive to allocate less computational resources to the
CC and return erroneous solutions, the CC should be able to verify the results from the CS.
In particular, at the end of the algorithm the CC can multiply A′ by the obtained solution
vector x, and compare the product to the constant vector b′. As in [24], the solution vector
x can be deemed correct if ||A′x − b′p|| ≤ ϵ, where ϵ is a small value. Since the result
verification is not the main focus of this paper, we refer the readers to other works for more
detailed discussions.
Table 4.2
Algorithm 2 A Privacy-Preserving Conjugate Gradient Method (PPCGM)
REQUIRE CC ←A′,b′
1. Generate u, v, and Z using (3.2)
2. Calculate Â′ = A′ + Z and transmit it and x0 to the CS
3. Receive h0
4. Calculate r0 using (4.29) and p0 = −r0, and transmit to cloud
5. WHILE
√
r⊤k rk > ν||b||2 do
6. Receive tk and fk
7. Compute αk using (4.31)
8. Compute rk+1 using (4.33)
9. Compute xk+1, βk+1, pk+1 using (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22), respectively.





PERFORMANCE AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the computational and memory I/O complexity of the pro-
posed PPCGM algorithm, and compare them with those of the previous works We also
present a thorough privacy analysis. Note that previous works can only work with square
coefficient matrices. To perform fair comparisons, we assume that they employ our pro-
posed Algorithm 4.1 to securely transform an arbitrary coefficient matrix into a square
matrix.
5.1 Computational Complexity
We define the computational complexity of a party as the number of floating-point
(flops) operations (additions, subtractions, multiplications, and divisions), bitwise opera-
tions, and encryptions that the party needs to perform. We note that an encryption takes
many flops, and a flop takes some bitwise operations. To determine the overall computa-
tional complexity for the client in PPCGM, we look into Algorithm 4.1 and Algorithm 4.2
in detail.
If the original coefficient matrix is not symmetric and definite positive, the CC runs
Algorithm 4.1 to construct such a matrix in equation (4.23). To this end, the CC computes
4 matrix-matrix additions and subtractions (1×mn+ 3× n2), 2 matrix-vector products
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(2× n(2m− 1)), 3 outer vector products (3× n2), 1 inner vector product (2n− 1), and 1
scalar-vector product (n), which takes 5mn+ 6n2 + n− 1 flops.
In line 4.2 of Algorithm 4.2, the client generates the random vector u and the random
matrix Z. To get u, the client uses a pseudo-random number generator like the Mersenne
Twister [17], which takes a constant number of bitwise operations per random number. To
get Z, the client multiplies u times the vector of constants v⊤ via n2 flops. We assume the
constants in v are pre-chosen by the client. In line 4.2, the client constructs the transformed
coefficient matrix Â′ through a matrix addition, which takes n2 flops. Thus, the total
number of operations required to get Â′ is 2n2 flops and Cn bitwise operations, where C
is the number of bitwise operations needed to generate a random number. In line 4.2, the
client computes r0 through one vector-vector multiplications (2n − 1), one vector-scalar
multiplication (n), and two vector-vector subtractions (2n), which takes 5n − 1 flops in
total. Note that p0 can be computed by the CS. The total computational complexity of the
initialization phase for the CC is 2n2 + 5n− 1 flops plus Cn bitwise operations.
To find αk in line 4.2, according to equation (4.31), the client performs 4 vector-vector
multiplications (4× (2n− 1)), a scalar subtraction, and a scalar division, which has a total
of 8n − 2 flops. In line 4.2, the client performs 1 vector-vector multiplication (2n − 1),
2 vector-scalar multiplications (2n), and 2 vector-vector additions (2n) to find rk+1. This
computation has a cost of 6n − 1 flops. Similarly, we observe xk+1, βk+1, pk+1 need 2n,
4n− 1, and 2n flops, respectively. Totally, the client performs 22Kn− 4K flops after K
iterations.
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Therefore, the total computational complexity of the PPCGM algorithm is O(mn)
flops plus O(n) bitwise operations.
In the scheme proposed by [14], as mentioned earlier, an arbitrary coefficient matrix
is transformed into a square matrix first, which takes 5mn+ 6n2 + n− 1 flops. Then,
a client encrypts its coefficient matrix by multiplying it with two permutation matrices,
which takes 2n2 flops. Similarly, the client performs 2n2 multiplications to decrypt the re-
ceived inverse matrix. To solve an LSE the client performs an additional matrix-vector mul-
tiplication. Thus, the total computational complexity is 5mn+ 12n2 − 1, i.e., O(mn),
flops.
The secure outsourcing proposed in [24] requires a client to perform a problem transfor-
mation that takes one diagonal matrix inversion, a matrix-vector multiplication, the mul-
tiplication of diagonal matrix and a matrix with a zero diagonal, the multiplication of a
diagonal matrix and a vector, and an additive homomorphic encryption of the elements of
the coefficient matrix. These operations take a total of 3n2−n flops plus n2 homomorphic
encryptions. Then in each iteration the client decrypts a vector and performs a vector addi-
tion, which takes n flops and n decryptions. Considering the transformation of an arbitrary
coefficient matrix into a square matrix, the total computational complexity for this work is
O(mn) flops +O(n2) encryptions.
A brief summary of computational complexity comparison between our algorithm and
previous works is shown in Table 5.1. To facilitate the comparison between our proposed
algorithm and previous works, we assume that only Algorithm 2 is executed, i.e., the input
coefficient matrix A is symmetric and positive definite and the CS skips Algorithm 1.
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5.2 Memory I/O Complexity
As mentioned before, to better capture the special memory I/O requirement of large-
scale LSEs, we propose a new definition of memory I/O complexity, which is the number
of values that areas follows. If the original LSE system is not symmetric and positive
definite, the CC runs Algorithm 4.1, which needs to read the original coefficient matrix
and write the new coefficient matrix. These operations take 2mn I/O operations. In line
4.2 of Algorithm 4.2, to construct Â′, the CC reads A′ and writes of Â′ to external memory,
which takes 2n2 I/O operations. Computing r0 requires one read of b′ which takes n I/O
operations. In the main iteration phase, the CC is able to make all of its operations within
the RAM memory. At the final iteration, the CC stores the solution x∗ into the external
memory, which takes n I/O operations. Therefore, the total memory I/O complexity of our
scheme is no more than 4n2 + 2n.
In [14], the CC hides its coefficient matrix using permutation matrices that need one
read of A and one write of the resulting matrix, which takes 2n2 I/O operations. The client
decrypts the received inverse matrix similarly, which takes another 2n2 I/O operations. To
find the solution vector, the CC performs a read of the inverse matrix and vector b and
a write of the final solution, which takes n2 + 2n I/O operations. Note that transform-
ing an arbitrary matrix into a square matrix for matrix inversion incurs 2n2 memory I/O
operations. The memory I/O complexity in [14] for general matrices is thus 7n2 + 2n.
In [24], the CC protects its data by transforming the problem through a matrix trans-
formation, which takes 3n2 + n I/O operations, and by encrypting the coefficient matrix,
which takes additional 2n2 I/O operations. At the final iteration, the CC also stores the re-
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sult in external memory which takes n I/O operations. Similarly, an arbitrary matrix needs
to be transformed into a square matrix first, which takes 2n2 I/O operations. Thus, the total
memory I/O complexity for the CC is 7n2 + 2n I/O operations.
A summary of memory I/O complexity comparison between our algorithm and previ-
ous works is also shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1






Gennaro et. al [5] O(n2) FHE crypt ops 6n2 + 2n I/O ops General
Wang et. al [23]
[25]
O(nρ) flops 6n2 + 2n I/O ops General
Lei et. al [14] O(n2) flops 7n2 + 2n I/O ops General
Attallah et. al [1] O(n2) flops 8n2 + 2n I/O ops General
Wang et. al [24] O(n2) flops +O(n2)
crypt ops
7n2 + 2n I/O ops Diagonally Dom-
inant
Our scheme O(n2) flops + O(n) bit
ops
4n2 + 2n I/O ops General
5.3 Privacy Analysis
Exploring the PPCGM algorithm proposed in Section 4, we observe that the CS only
has access to the transformed coefficient matrix Â′ and the conjugate vector pk. According
to Theorem 3.2, the transformed matrix Â′ is computationally indistinguishable from a
random matrix. Thus, the CS cannot derive any information about the coefficient matrix
A′ from the transformed matrix Â.
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We also observe that the CS is unable to derive information about the solution vector
xn. Specifically, to calculate xn the CS needs the knowledge of αk, which is calculated
with rk. However, the CC keeps αk and rk private. We also note from (4.22) that even
if the CS stores pk for all k, it cannot calculate rk because βk is kept private by the CC.
Moreover, from (4.19), rk also remains unknown from the CS since it would need the
coefficient matrix A′ to find it.
In addition, by keeping αk and rk private, the CC also prevents the CS to learn about
the vector b′ and hence b.
We also note that different from [24] where privacy can only be protected if the algo-
rithm converges within n iterations, the privacy in our algorithm can be protected no matter




In this section, we evaluate the computational and memory I/O complexity of the pro-
posed scheme for secure outsourcing of large-scale LSEs. We implement both the CC and
the CS parts of the algorithm in Matlab 2013b. We run the CC on a laptop with a dual-
core 2.4GHz CPU, 4GB RAM memory, and a 320GB hard disk at 5,400RPM. The CS is
implemented on Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). As explained in Section 4.2.3,
transforming A into A′ can be done just once for many LSEs. Therefore, we focus on the
performance of solving A′x = b′ with coefficient matrices of dimension n × n, with n
ranging from 5, 000 to 30, 000.
6.1 Computing Complexity
We first explore the computing time of our algorithm, in which the CC shifts most of
the computational burden to the cloud by outsourcing matrix-vector computations. We
compare our results to the iterative algorithm in [24] with 768-bit encryptions, which is
their best performing case. We notice that [24] employs the Jacobi method to solve diago-
nally dominant matrices, which may not converge when applied to a general matrix. Thus,
we compare the time that the CC takes to complete the computations in each iteration of
both algorithms. The results are summarized in Table 6.1. We observe that the CC is able
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to complete each iteration much faster in our scheme than in [24]. For example, in the
case when n = 5, 000 the CC in our algorithm completes an iteration in only 0.7ms, while
it takes 27s in [24], a difference of five orders of magnitude. We also notice that as the
dimension of the matrix increases, our performance gain is even more obvious. This is due
to the use of regular arithmetic in our scheme but the use of the computationally expensive
homomorphic decryptions in [24].
Table 6.1
Comparison of Average Computing Time Per Iteration for the CC
Matrix Size Our Algorithm [24]
n = 5, 000 0.70 ms 27.82 s
n = 8, 000 0.72 ms 46.06 s
n = 10, 000 0.76 ms 56.32 s
n = 30, 000 1.50 ms 121.81 s
6.2 Memory I/O complexity
We then evaluate the total memory I/O complexity of our algorithm. Again, since [24]
may not converge when applied to a general matrix, we compare such cost of our scheme
with that of [14]. We can see from Table 6.2 that our algorithm has much lower memory I/O
cost compared to [14], which is consistent with our I/O complexity analysis. For example,
when n = 5, 000, the CC’s total memory I/O access time is 3.4 minutes in our scheme
while 6.0 minutes in [14]. When n goes to 30, 000, the CC’s total memory I/O access
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Table 6.2
Comparison of Total Memory I/O Access Time for the CC
Matrix Size Our Algorithm [14]
n = 5, 000 3.4 min 6.0 min
n = 8, 000 13.5 min 23.6 min
n = 10, 000 14.2 min 24.8 min
n = 15, 000 23.4 min 40.8 min
n = 30, 000 64.7 min 171.3 min
time is 64.7 minutes in our scheme while 171.3 minutes in [14]. This shows a significant
difference, i.e., up to 62% time saving in our algorithm.
We also explore the total running time of the proposed algorithm in Table 6.3. We dis-
regard the communication time with the cloud so that we can focus on the total computing
and memory I/O access time. We observe that the total running time savings offered by our
algorithm are very attractive. For example, in the case of n = 5, 000 our scheme solves the
large-scale LSE in 3.6 minutes, while the scheme in [14] takes 6.2 minutes, indicating 42%
time saving in our algorithm. Moreover, in the case of n = 30, 000, the total running time
of our algorithm is 66.9 minutes, compared to a total of 192.7 minutes in [14]. Thus, our
algorithm achieves as high as 65% time saving, which is very impressive. In addition, from
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, we can tell that memory I/O operations lead to a very significant
part of the total running time, which shows the impact that memory I/O complexity has on
the overall algorithm performance. Therefore, low I/O complexity is indispensable for a
practical outsourcing algorithm.
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We finally plot Fig. 6.1 to more clearly compare the total running time of our algorithm
with that of [14]. In accordance to our theoretical results, we observe that the total running
time in each algorithm grows quadratically as the dimension of the coefficient matrix n
increases. We also notice that the time saving of our algorithm becomes more and more
significant compared to that of [14] as n increases.
Table 6.3
Comparison of Total Running Time
Matrix Size Our Algorithm [14]
n = 5, 000 3.6 min 6.2 min
n = 8, 000 13.7 min 24.6 min
n = 10, 000 14.5 min 26.7 min
n = 15, 000 23.9 min 43.6 min
n = 30, 000 66.9 min 192.7 min
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Figure 6.1
The total running time of our algorithm compared with that of [14].
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this thesis, we have investigated the problem of securely outsourcing large-scale
sparse LSEs. In particular, to protect the cloud client’s privacy, we develop a privacy-
preserving matrix transformation based on linear algebra and show that the resulting matrix
is computationally indistinguishable from a random one. Then, we propose a algorithm
based on the conjugate gradient method that can solve large-scale LSEs efficiently while
preserving the client’s privacy. Formal analysis shows that our proposed algorithm has
much lower computational and memory I/O complexities than previous works, and protects
the client’s privacy well. We finally conduct extensive experiments on Amazon Elastic
Compute Cloud (EC2) and find that our algorithm offers significantly less total running
time compared to previous works.
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